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Abstract 
Representations feature heavily in cognitive science theories about our behavioral repertoire. Their 
critical feature is its ability to designate (stand in for) spatially or temporally distant properties, so 
that organizing our behavior with respect to mental/neural representations means organizing our 
behavior with respect to the otherwise unavailable property they designate. Representations are a 
powerful tool, but serious problems (grounding, system-detectable error) remain unsolved. 
Ecological explanations reject representations. However, this has left us without a straight-forward 
vocabulary to engage with ‘representation-hungry’ problems involving spatial or temporal distance, 
nor the role of the nervous system in cognition. To develop such a vocabulary, here we show that 
ecological information functions to designate the ecologically-scaled dynamical world to an 
organism. We then show that this designation analysis of information leads to an ecological 
conceptualization of the neural activity caused by information, and finally we argue these together 
can support intentional behavior with respect to spatially and temporally distal properties. The way 
they do so (via designation) does mean information and the related neural activity can be 
conceptualized as representations; but they do so in a grounded way that remains true to key 
ecological ontological commitments. We advocate this path for expanding the ecological approach. 
 
Keywords: designation, representation, intentionality, ecological information, symbol grounding, 
system-detectable error, neural representation 
  
Introduction 
Mainstream accounts of cognition, and the role of the brain in cognition, are predicated on theories 
of (computational) mental and neural representation. These cognitive representations are not 
invoked on a whim; they take the forms they do because they are meant to enable three important 
features of cognition, 1) flexibility / intentionality, 2) successful perception, 3) higher order 
cognition. However, a number of issues with cognitive representations remain; the neural code by 
which they are instantiated in the brain is unknown, there is no broad agreement on their structure 
and format, and they may be fatally ungrounded (e.g. Harnad, 1990) and shut off from system 
detectable error (Bickhard, 2009). As long as cognitive neuroscience relies on cognitive 
representational theories, it inherits these problems. In the absence of alternatives, this might be an 
acceptable risk. If, on the other hand, a framework existed that could explain the key features of 
cognition while avoiding the problems that saddle cognitive representations, then neuroscience 
would be on firmer footing by adopting this theoretical basis instead.  
This paper attempts specifically to show how an alternative, ecological framework can explain all 
three key features of cognition that motivated early cognitive theorists while avoiding the problems 
of grounding and system-detectable error. We note that Gibsonian ecological information solves the 
poverty of stimulus problem via specification, and we then show that the details of this solution 
means information designates (stands in for) behaviorally relevant properties of the currently 
present world to cognitive systems. We then propose that this information interacts with nervous 
systems in a way that allows the resulting neural activity to serve as components that can designate 
more spatially and temporally distal properties for the cognitive system, and so support flexible, 
intentional, ‘higher-order’ cognition. We also argue that, because ecological information is a real, 
physically identifiable entity, with a lawful relationship to designated properties, it is a more 
grounded foundation for neuroscience than cognitive representations. Consequently, we think that 
this is a project worth pursuing.  
A brief note: this issue of designation connects directly to the notion of representation (hence the 
name of the paper), which obviously trips alarm bells for ecological psychologists. We will return to 
this point at the end. 
Why Cognitive Science Invokes Representations  
A good theory should explain the characteristics of a set of related phenomena. A good cognitive 
theory needs to explain the full range of behaviors we can perform, and most of these behaviors go 
beyond mechanical cause-and-effect. It is relatively uncomplicated to tell a causal story about 
simple, mechanically linked events. If we are sitting in a tree and the branch we are sitting on breaks, 
the force of gravity causes us to be displaced. The branch temporarily overcame the force of gravity 
which pulled us towards the ground. When this oppositional force was removed, our mass 
accelerated towards the ground according to the laws of motion. It is more challenging when events 
are not so obviously mechanically linked. For instance, if we move because a branch falls nearby, or 
because it is windy and we are worried that a branch might fall, what is it that causes our behavior 
to change? In this example, there was no mechanical linkage between the accelerating tree branch 
and our body; in the latter case, there was not even an accelerating tree branch at all, just the worry 
of one. Yet, we moved. Obviously, we do not move by accident or by magic. There are reasons and 
explanations, but these reside in a psychological level of explanation, which is why we need a 
psychological theory to fill the gap. 
Newell (1980) proposed a list of characteristics that a theory of cognition needs to be capable of 
addressing. To him, the most important feature is universality, which is the idea that a cognitive 
system must be able to behave as an (almost) arbitrary function of the environment. It must be able 
to be ‘about’ anything it encounters in the world; cognition must be intentional. Newell emphasized 
that implementing such a flexible, adaptive system in an actual, physical system was a major 
problem that must be addressed (Bechtel, 1998; Stich, 1992). 
We can divide the intentionality requirement into two sub-cases: 
1. Intentionality with respect to spatially distal properties. We can act intentionally towards 
properties of objects/events that are not in direct mechanical contact with us, via our 
perceptual contact with those objects/events. Cognitive theories consider perception to be 
impoverished and ambiguous, meaning that successful intentional interaction with the 
environment requires a system to supplement/structure perceptual contact with stored 
knowledge. But, even non cognitive approaches must explain how organisms coordinate 
behavior with respect to environmental properties that are not in direct mechanical contact. 
2. Intentionality with respect to higher order or temporally distal properties. We can act 
intentionally towards higher-order properties of objects/events that might not be present in, 
or might even be in opposition to, the current environment. Here, our perceptual contact 
with such entities is non-existent, so again our experience must be supplemented to support 
successful intentional interactions.  
Early cognitive scientists (e.g. Fodor, 1980; Pylyshyn, 1989) argued that universality could only be 
implemented in a computational system because these have the requisite indefinite flexibility and 
can in principle be realized in a variety of physical systems. It is commonly argued that 
computational systems are necessarily representational1. Therefore, the primary motivation for 
cognitive psychology to treat cognition as necessarily representational is that computation has been 
the best way to explain how cognitive intentionality and flexibility could be (at least in theory) 
implemented in a physical system. The current mainstream consensus is therefore that cognition 
requires mental representations that are internal to the system (specifically, implemented in the 
brain2) and computational in nature.  
                                                          
1 But see Piccinini, 2004, 2008 for an argument against this 
2 Although note that the relationship between mental and neural states (i.e., the neural code) remains a major 
unsolved issue in cognitive neuroscience. 
How do these representations gain traction on the problem of intentionality? Ramsey (2007) has 
analyzed the concept of representation in extensive detail. He has identified that in order to have 
any bite, representation has to mean something more than simply an “inner” or “causally relevant” 
state (p 8). While there remain many arguments about the format and content of cognitive 
representations, Ramsey argues that, regardless of bells and whistles, all cognitive theories of 
representation rest upon “the basic idea that inner structures in some way serve to stand for, 
designate, or mean something else” (Ramsey, p 3, emphasis ours). Newell (1980) usefully defines 
designation like this: 
Designation: An entity X designates an entity Y relative to a process P, if, when P 
takes X as input, its behavior depends on Y. 
There are two keys to this definition: First, the concept is grounded in the behavior of 
a process. Thus, the implications of designation will depend on the nature of this 
process. Second, there is action at a distance . . . This is the symbolic aspect, that 
having X (the symbol) is tantamount to having Y (the thing designated) for the 
purposes of process P (Newell, 1980, p. 156). 
Cognitive representations therefore try to fulfill the intentional job description of a good 
theory of cognition on the basis of their computational, representational ability to 
designate otherwise inaccessible properties to a cognitive system. 
Problems with Cognitive Representations 
Though cognitive representations remain central to cognitive models, they have not been accepted 
uncritically, even from within the pro-representation camp. There is no consensus on the format and 
structure of cognitive representations, nor how representations are instantiated in neural activity. 
Worse, there are still critical concerns about whether representations, of any structure or format, 
can do the intentional work cognitive scientists need them to do.  
The first of these concerns is that representational systems (of any type) do not necessarily come 
with intrinsic access to intentional content and, thus, cannot actually be ‘about’ anything without 
external help (the symbol grounding problem3, Bickhard, 2009; ‘empty symbols’, Harnad, 1990; 
Searle, 1980). Symbolic representations, for example, allow an arbitrary mapping between the 
structure of the representation and the thing it is meant to represent. This provides crucial flexibility 
for universality, but because the mapping is arbitrary there is no guaranteed way for the 
representation to have any content, let alone the right content (this problem has most recently been 
laid out in detail in the interface theory of perception; Hoffman, Singh & Prakesh, 2015; see also 
Wilson, 2018a).  
Attempts to solve the grounding problem often try to link abstract or higher-order mental 
representations to more basic perceptual representations (e.g. Barsalou, 1999; Harnad, 1990). Such 
well-motivated attempts fail, however, due to the lack of an adequate theory of perception (Turvey 
et al, 1981; Wilson, 2018a) which means that even the lower perceptual representations lack 
internally defined content.  This “infinite regress of interpreters interpreting” (Bickhard, 2009, p 573) 
is endemic to any representational account where content is defined externally, which Bickhard 
argues includes all the main types of representation (including the theories of Milikan, Fodor, 
Dretske, and Cummins).  
The second, related concern is that symbolic/representational systems do not automatically come 
with a frame of reference to identify when they are making errors. Without a way to identify when a 
system is behaving incorrectly, behavior cannot adapt to become better attuned to the environment 
(Bickhard, 2009). Error-guided learning requires that a system be able to detect representational 
errors. But, this ability depends on access to representational content – a system cannot know that it 
is wrong if it is blindly trading in symbols with inaccessible content. An example is the arbitrary 
                                                          
3 Not everyone thinks the problem remains (Steels, 1997; Taddeo & Floridi, 2007). But the debate remains 
(Bringsjord, 2015; Wilson, 2018a) and so, for the people who, like us, still worry about this problem, we discuss 
it here and later, endeavour to solve it. 
relationship between letters and sounds. If you have ever tried to help a child learn to read4, you will 
know that you cannot simply hand them a piece of paper with words on; there is nothing intrinsic to 
the representational letter system that allows the child to know what the sound is or when they are 
making a mistake. Learning to read is possible, but detecting an error requires extensive support 
from outside the representational system, in the form of a teacher, and even then it is 
extraordinarily difficult to learn. Given the absence of an external teacher, the relationship between 
cognitive representations and the things they represent must be internally available within the 
bounds of the representational system in order for system-detectable error to be possible. 
According to Bickhard’s analysis, no current representational accounts achieve this. 
For these and other reasons, non-representational theories of cognition are becoming more 
common. These are, for the most part, derived from Gibson’s ecological approach to perception-
action (Gibson, 1979).  
Ecological Alternatives 
Affordance-Based Approaches 
To get around these problems, a variety of ‘radical’ theories of cognition argue that one or more of 
the key features of cognition can be successfully explained without invoking representations (e.g. 
Chemero, 2009; Gibson, 1979; Kono, 2009; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Schmidt, 2007; Van Dijk & 
Withagen, 2015). These theories typically rest on Gibson’s demonstration that there is no poverty of 
stimulus. There is now evidence for a wealth of high-quality perceptual information available to 
support coordination with spatially distal properties, and so the case for representations is undercut 
in this behavioral domain.  
To try and move into the domain of more ‘representation-hungry’ problems (higher order and/or 
temporally distal properties), these approaches generally expand Gibson’s notion of affordances to 
                                                          
4 Thanks to Elliott & Sylvia Golonka for inspiring this example 
include any relation that can be defined between an organism and its environment, up to and 
including social, linguistic, and cultural relations (Chemero, 2009; Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2018; 
Rietveld et al, 2014). Unfortunately, these theories lack a mechanism by which these relational 
affordances might be perceived. If an organism cannot come into psychological contact with such 
relational affordances, then they are not a suitable basis for a theory of cognition (Golonka, 2015; 
Wilson, 2018b). For this reason, we argue that any attempt to scale up ecological psychology must 
begin with the ecological information organisms are in contact with, and how organisms can use 
information in the selection and control of increasingly complex and abstract behaviors.  
An Information-Based Approach 
The proposed components of a cognitive theory must support intentional behavior, including cases 
where the behaviorally-relevant properties of objects or events are spatially and/or temporally 
distal. Furthermore, the components must have grounded intentional content and enable system-
detectable error. Neither cognitive representational theories nor affordance-based non-
representational theories can, to date, fulfill this entire job description. Cognitive psychology 
therefore still has a bill to pay, and because cognitive neuroscience is cognitive psychological 
theories, it is on the hook for the debt.  
In order to successfully address all three key features of cognitive systems, we propose an expansion 
of the ecological approach grounded in the use of ecological information. We will argue that 
ecological information functions to designate the world to an organism. This framing emerges quite 
naturally from careful consideration of the nature of ecological information; how it comes to be, and 
how it is used by an organism. We then argue that information shapes behavior by changing the 
spatiotemporal activity of the nervous system so that this activity designates the information to the 
action systems. We then propose that the designation relationship between environmental 
properties and ecological information, and between information and the neural activity it creates, 
supports intentional behavior with respect to the behaviorally-relevant properties of objects or 
events, even those that are not currently present in the organism’s task environment. Thanks to 
specification, this chain of designation remains firmly grounded and capable of supporting error 
detection and correction. As a result, we suggest that this theoretical perspective is the best current 
starting point for understanding how the nervous system mediates between perception and action. 
The rest of this paper steps through this analysis in detail.  
An Ecological Approach to Cognition & Neuroscience 
Our approach to a general ecological theory of cognition is grounded in the nature of ecological 
information. In this section, we will explain what information is, its function to the organism, and 
what it does to the nervous system. With this in hand, we will identify how these components fulfill 
the job description for a theory of cognition.  
Ecological Information Specifies Environmental Properties 
Ecological information is constituted by higher-order relational patterns in energy arrays. These 
patterns are created by the lawful interaction of the energy array with the dynamics of the world 
(Turvey et al, 1981) and are used by organisms to perceive that world (Gibson, 1966, 1979; Michaels 
& Carello, 1981).  
Properties of objects and events in the world change over space and time in ways that reflect the 
composition and organization of these properties. Consequently, these properties are best described 
at the level of dynamics (Bingham, 1988, 1995) which allows units of time, position (and its 
derivatives), and mass. Our perceptual systems are not in direct mechanical contact with most 
environmental properties of interest, however. Instead, they are in contact with energy media like 
light and sound. Structures in energy media reflect the composition and structure of the local 
environment. But, whereas properties of the environment are best described at the level of 
dynamics, structures in energy media are only kinematic projections of these properties (Bingham, 
1988; Turvey et al, 1981). Kinematics is a level of description that only refers to motions; the units 
are time, position (and its derivatives), but not mass. For a given property, the kinematic description 
will not be identical to the dynamic description because mass is not represented in kinematics (the 
‘perceptual bottleneck,’ Bingham, 1988).  
Fortunately, properties of the environment are projected into energy media via a law-based process. 
The details of the projection are unambiguously related to the details of the dynamic that caused it, 
and different dynamical properties project differently. Consequently, the kinematic patterns specify 
(i.e., map 1:1 to) the dynamical properties that caused them, without needing to be identical to 
them (Gibson, 1979; Turvey et al, 1981). Ecological information is, therefore, a kinematic 
specification of dynamical properties (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983). Its function is to enable an 
organism to be connected to those properties without requiring mechanical contact so we can 
successfully interact with a (typically distant) task environment. 
Ecological Information Designates the Dynamical World to Organisms 
When we talk about an organism ‘successfully interacting with a task’ it means that the organism’s 
behavior complements the dynamics of the task. From an ecological stance, a system that exhibits 
intentionality is one whose behavior is appropriately organized with respect to task dynamics.  
Almost all behaviorally relevant dynamics in the world are ‘over there’; they are spatially or 
temporally distal and not in mechanical contact with the organism; and yet, all animals can couple 
and coordinate behavior with respect to some subset of relevant distal properties. We achieve this 
by being in contact with lawfully created, specifying kinematic projections of those dynamics into the 
energy media those dynamics are embedded in. We humans and all other animals are also 
embedded in these energy media, and we have evolved specialized perceptual systems that reliably 
react to contact with structured energy arrays5. Therefore, the projection of dynamic properties into 
                                                          
5 The existence of specific kinematic projections provided an evolutionary resource to guide the selection of 
increasingly sophisticated perceptual systems, which enable behavior to be coupled to and coordinated with 
distal properties. In fact, we would argue that those seeking to understand why perceptual systems have 
evolved the form they do should begin with a careful analysis of the spatiotemporal structure of the types of 
information to which they are sensitive. 
energy arrays connects task dynamics to organisms. We suggest that it is useful to think of the 
function of information for organisms as designating environmental properties.  
With reference to Newell’s (1980) definition described above, P’s behavior depends on the specified 
dynamical property Y; and the structure of P is only explainable with reference to X and its 
relationship to Y. The general finding in ecological behavioral research shows that the form of a 
behavior is coordinated and controlled with respect to task-relevant dynamical properties, but that 
the details of the behavior map tightly onto the structure of the information involved. For example, 
the behavioral-level characteristics of coordinated rhythmic movement are accounted for by the 
structure of relative direction, which is the specifying information for the dynamical property 
relative phase (Bingham, 2001, 2004a, b, reviewed in Golonka & Wilson, 2012, 2018; see Wilson et 
al, 2005 for a key empirical demonstration). This means that, while coordinated rhythmic movement 
is intentional with respect to a dynamic property of the world, organisms achieve coordination only 
by using a kinematic information variable as a stand-in. Importantly, as demonstrated by Wilson et al 
(2005), we can detect this distinction experimentally – it is not merely a theoretical stance. These 
results unambiguously support the claim that behavior (P) complements the environment (Y) by 
virtue of the organism’s contact with information (X). 
The consequence of ecological information on perception-action systems is, therefore, best 
explained by invoking the ability of information to designate properties of objects and events in the 
world. In fact, we would struggle to explain why organisms react to structure in kinematic arrays 
without invoking the ability of these patterns to designate world properties.  
Usefully, this particular designation is firmly grounded and supports error detection and correction. 
Ecological information is the result of a law-based process, which makes the content of that 
information non-arbitrary; the consequent neural activity we discuss in the next section then inherits 
that grounding (Harnard, 1990). Errors can occur when the information variable being used does not 
specify the currently relevant task dynamics (because it is the wrong variable to use, or because of 
an experimental perturbation). However, because of specification, nothing additional to the 
information is required for it to mean what it does and be used to coordinate and control behavior; 
information is internally related to its contents (c.f. Bickhard, 2009). Any mismatch is therefore 
readily available to the organism and can drive corrections. There is a growing experimental 
literature on this type of error correction (e.g. Jacobs, Michaels & Runeson, 2000; Jacobs, Runeson & 
Michaels, 2001; van der Meer et al, 2012; Withagen & van Wermeskerken, 2009) which in turn has 
led to the development of the direct learning theory (Jacobs & Michaels, 2007). Information is 
functioning as a stand-in for the distal environment, but it happens to be an excellent one. 
Neural Activity Designates Information to Behavioral Systems 
Property-specifying patterns in kinematic arrays provide a mechanism connecting the world to 
perceptual systems. We also need a mechanism connecting information to behavior. It is obvious 
that the nervous system is the primary connection between information and behavior, but our 
ecological analysis presents a decidedly novel way to characterize what the nervous system needs to 
accomplish. Specifically, we must explain how information causes changes in nervous system activity 
such that resultant actions complement environmental properties. Given that behavior typically 
tracks the form of the information being used, an initial parsimonious hypothesis is that the nervous 
system supports this by preserving ecological informational structure.  
Explicitly ecological analyses of neural activity (i.e. tracking the neural consequences of interacting 
with ecological information) are currently rare, but the studies that do exist support our hypothesis 
(e.g. Agyei et al, 2015; Magrassi et al (2015); van der Meer et al, 2012; van der Weel & van der Meer, 
2009). For example, van der Meer et al measured the magnitude of the correlation between 
looming-related information variables and neural activity. They found that the strength of this 
relationship predicted task performance. In fact, changes in the magnitude of the correlations in an 
individual predicted changes in performance over time. In other words, task performance (the 
extent to which behavior complements task dynamics) depended on how well informational 
structure was preserved in neural activity.  
This reconceptualization of the neural code follows naturally from the ecological analysis of 
behavior. Rather than operating by synchronizing oscillations at various frequencies, the language of 
the brain may be more akin to the continuously unfolding nature of ecological information. The 
existence of this type of ongoing activity, similar to so-called travelling waves, has been known about 
for decades (see Hughes, 1995 for a review), but it has not made much of an impact on 
neuroscience. One reason is that common neuropsychological techniques (e.g., EEG recording at the 
scalp, averaging across trials) effectively obscure travelling-wave effects (Muller et al, 2018). In 
addition, there is no way to really understand what the structure of nervous system activity is doing 
without looking at the structure of energy entering the system. The ecological conception of 
information is the first coherent theory of how patterns in energy media relate to relevant 
environmental properties, and, therefore, is the best existing theoretical account from which to 
analyze how the spatiotemporal structure of neural activity enables intentional behavior. 
An Information-Based Theory of Cognition 
We now have a set of ecological components (information and the neural activity it creates) that can 
enable us to propose a general ecological account of cognition and the brain.  
Information immediately enables the first two key features of cognitive systems: 
1. Intentionality: Because ecological information variables specify biologically relevant task 
dynamical properties (rather than perceptual primitives), they are inherently meaningful 
(Turvey et al, 1981) and support behavioral flexibility (Newell’s universality). Even a 
completely novel object or event will have properties in common with things we have 
already encountered, which will cause familiar kinematic projections and provide a basis for 
exploring the new context. In the absence of access to familiar properties, behavior falls 
apart (e.g., during a whiteout). 
2. Action with respect to spatially distal properties: The lawful process by which the dynamical 
world is projected into information enables the kinematic specification of those dynamics. 
While there is a physical distance between us and most of the world, this distance is literally 
filled with structure in energy media that is specific to biologically relevant properties of 
distal objects and events. This law-based process also supports grounding and system-
detectable error as the content is internally defined. 
To tackle the third motivation (action with respect to temporally distal properties) we must now 
move beyond well-trodden paths for ecological psychology to build an argument about how 
information and consequent neural activity can support ‘higher order cognition’ and ‘thinking about 
things in their absence’.  
Ecological ‘Higher-Order’ Cognition 
Research on ecological information focuses on the continuous control of action. This tells us a great 
deal about how information structures real-time, online interactions with the world. But, especially 
for humans, behavior often reflects the influence of things that are not currently present in the 
environment. For example, a person might choose to have a decaf coffee at lunch after 
remembering how much regular coffee they drank that morning. This moves us into the territory of 
so-called ‘representation-hungry’ problems (Clark & Toribio, 1994). Even Barsalou (1999), who 
worked very hard to defend the importance of perception in cognition, hypothesized that perceptual 
experience is reified into perceptual symbols, which could form the basis of “higher” cognitive 
functioning.  
The ecological solution we develop below remains firmly grounded in ecological information. Our 
goal is to identify how and when some portion of spatiotemporal structure of neural activity caused 
by ecological information might become decoupled from the information. Decoupled activity 
provides a cognitive resource to organisms, which allows the possibility of structuring behavior with 
respect to temporally distal properties. We will now step through this in detail. 
Action Control, Action Selection, Neural Representations 
Our developing solution begins by identifying that information can both control actions and select6 
them (Golonka, 2015). Action selection occurs when an organism chooses between alternatives, 
changes from one task to another, or parameterizes the performance of the current task. When a 
friend asks you to ‘pick up the red cup’, information in the auditory signal enables you to select 
which of two cups you pick up. You then use visual and proprioceptive information specifying the 
location of the cup and the movement of your arm to implement and control the action.  
The two roles (action control and action selection) place different requirements on information. In 
order for information to support action control, it must change in behaviorally-relevant real time as a 
direct function of some task-relevant property in the environment. In other words, it must 
continuously specify the current state of the world that created the information (e.g. as relative 
direction does for relative phase; Wilson & Bingham, 2008). This is what enables ecological 
information variables to support real-time coupling of behavior to properties currently present in 
the task environment.  
But while all ecological information is lawfully related to the properties of objects or events in the 
world that create the information, organisms are not law-bound to use that information in a 
particular way (Wilson 2018b). Following Golonka (2015), when the behavioral consequences of 
information are not related to the object or event that caused the information, we say information 
has had a conventional (as opposed to law-based) effect on behavior.7  
                                                          
6 Selection is also referred to as coordination in the literature. 
7 This notion of conventionality has much in common with Pattee’s ideas about symbols in biological systems 
(e.g., Pattee, 2012). 
If one encounters a door that says “Danger: Bear Inside,” the behaviorally-relevant properties of the 
bear do not structure patterns in ambient light that reach your retina because the bear is occluded 
by a door. However, ecological information caused by the sign on that door can cause neural activity 
that participates in selecting actions related to these distal properties (e.g., avoidance). The fact that 
some scribbles on a sign shape functional action selection reflects a long-term immersion of a 
particular type of nervous system (i.e., human) in a particular type of learning context (i.e., one that 
encourages written communication). But, critically, from the first person perspective of the 
organism, it is just interacting with information.  
For our purposes, the relevant distinction between information used to select versus control actions 
concerns the stability of consequent neural activity. There is no convincing evidence that we can 
decouple neural activity sufficient to support action control from the presence of the relevant 
information in the environment. One example of this that experienced drivers, despite being able to 
successfully steer a real car, are unable to realistically mime the action of steering, and often do so in 
ways that would have catastrophic consequences in actual driving contexts (Wallis et al, 2007). 
Without ongoing informational support, action control eventually falls apart. Knowing how to steer 
in a real driving context is not the same as, and does not entail, making our nervous system act as if 
it is steering absent that context. This basic distinction (in the form of the online vs offline control of 
actions) also shows up in most of the core work around the two visual streams hypothesis; see 
Goodale, et al, (2004) for a review.  
In contrast, we are often able to instantiate neural activity corresponding the spatiotemporal 
structure of information used in action selection. This is likely to be the case if 1) we have an 
appropriate precipitating event and 2) the structure of the information is simple, short, and/or well-
practiced and stereotypical enough to have had a reliable functional effect on corresponding neural 
activity during learning. In humans, a familiar example of such neural activity is the experience of 
inner speech. The structure of individual words for an experienced language user is simple, short, 
well-practiced and relatively stereotypical. The right precipitating event (e.g., reading the sign 
“Danger: Bear Inside”) can reliably instantiate neural activity with the spatiotemporal structure of 
the acoustic information caused by pronouncing these words. The result is that we “hear” the words 
in our heads (e.g. Breen & Clifton, 2013). This example relies on a close relationship between 
information present in the moment and the neural activity (i.e., they contain the same words in 
different modalities), but this connection is not obligatory. We could imagine training someone on a 
convention that a red circle on a door means that there is a bear inside8. In this case, the information 
created by the colored circle causes neural activity that is structurally similar to the auditory 
information caused by the word “bear.” This neural activity functions as a stand-in for the acoustic 
ecological information for the word “bear.”9  The structure of the activity has been shaped by the 
repeated presence of the acoustic information in real life. But now, the neural activity is stable 
enough to be instantiated by an appropriate precipitating event. Through this relationship, the 
neural activity corresponding to the spatiotemporal structure of the word “bear” can impact action 
selection – for example, by selecting avoidance behaviors. Once an action is selected, the actual 
escape from the bear will require access to online information suitable for action control; the neural 
activity corresponding to the word “bear” cannot tell your legs how to move with respect to the 
supporting surface of the floor. 
This is a simple example of how ecological information can enable functional behavior with respect 
to things not in the present environment, via things that are. There are two things worth drawing 
attention to. First, neural activity decoupled from ecological information present in the environment 
only has the power to select actions, not to control them. Second, decoupled neural activity is not 
simply an example of mental representation grounded in perceptual experience. They are re-
instantiations of neural activity caused by ecological information. Such re-instantiations can have a 
                                                          
8 This example is language based, but the idea is effectively classical conditioning, an ability which is ubiquitous 
in the animal kingdom, so note that ‘conventions’ do not have to be linguistically expressed. 
9 Another example is how trained language users experience the heart symbol in the famous ‘I ❤ NY’ as if it 
were the spoken word “heart.” 
phenomenality; it feels like something to hear language in our heads or to imagine someone’s face; 
and they can have a consequence on future behavior by impacting selection of actions or selection 
of other neural activity (e.g., we continue our train of inner speech). But this neural activity, while 
internal, is not the same as a mental representation in standard cognitive theories.  
An ecological framework that includes both designating information and the neural activity it creates 
can therefore provide a psychological level of analysis that connects intentional behavior to 
temporally distal environmental properties. Thus, this framework is robust enough to address all 
three key features of cognitive systems outlined earlier.  
How to Handle More Abstract Cognition 
With this analysis in place, we will now discuss how neural instantiations of action-selecting 
information could enable some of the trickier aspects of human cognition. Only neural activity that 
meets our working definition of designation (i.e., that designates an environmental property with 
respect to corresponding ecological information) will be considered. Also, let us recall that not all 
such neural activity will be stable enough to instantiate in the absence of the corresponding 
information. In fact, there should be a distribution of stability, such that some neural 
representations can be re-instantiated quite accurately (in the sense of a strong systematic 
relationship between neural activity and information, rather than an exact replica of the structure of 
the information), some with a certain degree of accuracy, some with very poor accuracy, and some, 
not at all. For the purposes of this discussion, we are concerned with the subset of neural activity 
that can be re-instantiated with fair to good accuracy.  
In order to support counterfactual and other higher-order cognition, cognitive scientists often argue 
that knowledge systems must be both conceptual and componential, to allow complex expressions 
to be decomposed and new expressions to be built up, i.e. productivity (Chomsky, 1957; Dietrich & 
Markman, 2003; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Haugeland, 1991). Conceptual systems are removed from 
the particulars of a situation – they can represent general cases (concepts) rather than individuals 
(Barsalou, 1999). Componential systems contain parts that can be combined (and re-combined) 
according to, for example, a recursive syntax. Symbol systems can quite clearly realize these 
features, which is what makes them such a good option for supporting counterfactual thinking and 
context-dependent flexibility10.  
Counterfactual thinking is clearly a capacity of at least some cognitive systems. Thus, our main 
challenge is to show that an ecological approach can support counterfactual thinking. We do not 
have any stock in whether or not this solution involves a conceptual and componential system, so if 
the ecological solution does not have these features, it is not really a blow to our primary argument. 
However, as it turns out, we think that certain features of our ecological components mean that 
they do enable conceptual, componential systems, making their ability to support higher-order 
cognition easier to see. 
It is uncontroversial to say that developing a concept requires experience with multiple individuals of 
a type. For us, this would involve (at a minimum) repeated exposure to ecological information 
variables specifying properties of a given type. The neural activity caused by this repeated exposure 
will vary in many respects based on the details of the individuals and differences in neural states 
when information makes contact with the nervous system. However, if the individuals tend to share 
any ecologically specified properties (i.e., if they really are a type) then there will be correspondingly 
stable aspects of shared neural activity, invariants over the transformation of experience11. This 
subset of neural activity would acquire a certain degree of stability, such that the activity can be re-
instantiated, given the right precipitating event, in the absence of the corresponding information. 
Because ecological information designates properties and not individuals, this kernel of stable neural 
activity can designate properties associated with a type. This means that ecological neural activity of 
a certain kind can function as concepts.  
                                                          
10 Systematicity is also discussed, but Johnson (2004) effectively argued against the evidence for and necessity 
of systematicity in language and thought, so we will remain focused on the other three characteristics here. 
11 We mean this as an explicit analogy to EJ Gibson’s (1969) differentiation theory of perceptual learning. 
This same subset of neural activity can also support componential systems. We predict that stable 
neural activity will only emerge if the corresponding information is sufficiently simple, short, and 
stereotyped. This type of neural activity is a component – it is a bit that can participate in a number 
of events made up of other bits. These ecological neural components then enable productivity in the 
following way. Neural activity of this kind can impact action selection. Some of these actions can be 
the instantiation of further neural activity. Some of the variance in what actions are selected by a 
given neural activation will be explained by the learning history of the organism. For instance, if the 
acoustic event for the letter “B” almost always follows the acoustic event of the letter “A” in a 
person’s learning history, then activating “A” will tend to select the activity for “B” (such as when 
you start singing the ABC song in your head).  But some of the variance will also be explained by the 
current context, summarized in the informational environment and current neural and bodily state 
of the organism. So, if you are watching West Side Story, then activating “A” may select the 
subsequent activity “…Jet is a Jet is a Jet all the way.” Therefore, ecological neural components can 
be combined in multiple ways with other neural components and the grounded way they do so is 
functionally related to learning history and current context12. In addition, because information 
designates properties, not individuals, it and the related neural activity do not suffer from the holism 
that, some argue (e.g. Barsalou, 1999) makes typical perceptual theories unable to support 
componentiality.  
Conceptual, componential, and productive systems support aspects of higher-order cognition like 
counterfactual thinking, thinking about impossible things, and talking about imaginary things. As we 
said before, we believe that the important task for us here is to show how ecological psychology can 
support higher-order cognition, whether or not the ecological solution also requires a conceptual 
and componential system. But, if the reader endorses the logic that aspects of higher-order 
cognition naturally follow from concepts, componentiality, and productivity, then we hope to have 
                                                          
12 The literature on the limits of classical conditioning and chains of associations may be informative for future 
refinements of this analysis 
shown how ecological neural activity possess these features. We think this demonstration does 
some important work in justifying the viability of our approach, but we would like to add one final 
point to this discussion. We think that approaching higher-cognition from an ecological basis leads to 
a fundamentally different flavor of analysis to the typical cognitive approach, one which places less 
emphasis on representational system features reflecting the influence of computer science on 
cognitive science and more emphasis on action selection and control. We attempt a brief example of 
such an analysis below.  
A common problem that seems to demand mental representation is the act of talking about 
something imaginary. This is a complex problem if you treat language as a system of reference; 
when I say the word ‘unicorn’, to what do I refer, since the referent does not literally exist? If, 
instead, you treat language as a system for selecting the actions of yourself and others (i.e. if it is a 
tool; Bickhard, 2009; Everett, 2012) then this problem becomes identical to the problem of using 
information conventionally to select an action (e.g. the bear and the sign example). Our experiences 
of using the word ‘unicorn’ dictate the kind of tool that it is and the kind of actions that it can select. 
When asked to describe a unicorn, a speaker might select the speech actions ‘a horse with a horn’ or 
something similar. From the perspective of the informational and neural components engaged in 
action selection, talking about imaginary things is exactly the same kind of process as talking about 
real things, talking about impossible scenarios, considering multiple possible outcomes, and 
imagining how things might have been different.  
The analysis above is very brief and we agree that ecological psychologists should tackle these tricky 
problems head on, preferably accompanied by lots of data. But, we hope to have shown that 
recognizing the role of information in action selection and its relationship to the consequent neural 
activity does provide the necessary foot in the door (and a necessary vocabulary) for an ecological 
analysis of higher-order cognition. 
Is This Analysis Representational? Does It Have To Be? 
We have relied quite heavily on the notion of designation, which describes when one thing stands in 
for and is used in place of another thing that you actually want to interact with but cannot, for some 
reason (Newell, 1980). We argued that this is a useful framing within which to explain what 
ecological information and the resulting neural activity is for, to an organism.  
If this sounds to the reader like we are describing a representation, you would, according to many, 
be right. Ramsey (2007) has analyzed the concept of cognitive representation in great detail, and 
emphasizes that while there is little agreement on exactly how cognitive representations work or the 
format they work in, in order to have any bite, representation has to mean something more than 
simply an “inner” or “causally relevant” state. (Ramsey, 2007 p 8). Ramsey concludes that regardless 
of format or other bells and whistles, the essence of all cognitive theories of representation is “the 
basic idea that inner structures in some way serve to stand for, designate, or mean something else” 
(Ramsey, p 3, emphasis ours).  
It may therefore be entirely reasonable to treat both information and the consequent neural activity 
as representations. These representations are, however, not the computational mental 
representations of mainstream cognitive psychology, nor could they simply be swapped into such 
theories. Unlike traditional representations, which must enrich, model or predict sensory data, the 
psychological power of our decoupled neural activity can only come from its relationship to external 
ecological information and the property it designates, and that information is given to, rather than 
invented by, the nervous system (Wilson, 2018a). 
Is it worth re-conceptualizing information and the consequent neural activity as representations, 
though? After all, ecological psychology has always been explicitly anti-representational and a key 
feature of the current analysis (ecological information solves the poverty of stimulus problem and 
thus redefines the job description for the brain) has historically been used to motivate non-
representational approaches to cognitive science (e.g. Chemero, 2009; also by us, Wilson & Golonka, 
2013). While it is not compulsory to go from designation to representation, there are two reasons 
why it may be a useful framing to pursue.   
First, like it or not, the motivations we identified (especially thinking about thing in their absence) 
are features of cognition that need to be explained, and perceptual information used for the control 
of action does not solve the problems by itself. An expanded notion of how information can be used 
(i.e., selection) and how it works with the nervous system is required. We have shown here that this 
depends on the issue of designation, so if we want an ecological neuroscience and an account of 
‘representation-hungry’ cognition, we quite naturally end up in representational territory. If this 
ends up being productive, we will note that we have also shown that information and the 
consequent neural activity is grounded and can support system-detectable error, so at least they will 
be good representations.  
The second reason is that removing the embargo on the word “representation” may bring the 
nervous system, its learning history, and its state in a current context back to the main stage. Gibson 
made a public relations mistake calling his approach ‘direct perception’. The name makes perfect 
sense, but it has come to imply (for supporters and critics alike) that perception is a free ride; that 
we simply ‘see’ the world, no cognitive or neural gymnastics required. This is not true. Ecological 
information does specify the world and is a good stand-in for the world, but it is not the same as the 
world. This means that a) we have to learn to use it as a stand-in (development and perceptual 
learning should feature front and center of all our theories, e.g. Wicklegren & Bingham, 2001) and b) 
we will only be able to interact with the world in terms of how it has been projected into 
information. This last point places meaningful constraints on our search for explanations of our 
behavior and our neural activity (Golonka & Wilson, 2012, 2018).  
This error, of treating the world as simply a given to a cognitive agent, is quite real. In recent years 
efforts have been made to extend the ecological approach into domains beyond perception and 
action, especially language and social psychology (Chemero, 2009; Heft, 2007; Kono, 2009; Rietveld 
& Kiverstein, 2014; Schmidt, 2007) but also the brain (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014). As we noted 
earlier, these efforts all extend Gibson’s notion of affordances to become opportunities for linguistic 
or social actions that simply account for the behavior of interest. But, affordances, while interesting, 
are properties of the world, and must be perceived. The critical question (as Gibson himself 
emphasized) is actually about whether and how these properties are informationally specified, and, 
despite some efforts (Bruineberg, Chemero & Rietveld, 2018) there is currently no good account for 
that, nor is one likely (Wilson, 2018b). We have argued recently (Golonka, 2015) that any extension 
of the ecological approach into so-called higher-order, ‘representation-hungry’ cognition therefore 
requires extending our understanding of the form, content and use of information, which is what we 
have continued here. If a broader ecological cognitive science and neuroscience is to become a 
reality, this is the path we need to take.  
All that said, nothing in our analysis hinges on calling neural correlates of ecological information 
variables ‘representations’. All that matters are the more specific details of the designating nature of 
information and the related neural activity we have detailed here. 
Summary 
A good theory of cognition must account for three key features; implementing intentionality in a 
physical system, addressing poverty of stimulus concerns to allow intentionality with respect to 
things currently present, and identifying how we can be intentional with respect to things that are 
not currently present. Fulfilling this job description led to a strong case for computational mental 
representations as key players in our theories of cognition, because such systems potentially have 
the necessary properties to address all three motivations (Fodor, 1980; Newell, 1980; Pylyshyn, 
1989). However, these kinds of representations are not a slam-dunk solution. If you have 20 years to 
spare, we encourage you to peruse this literature and note the many ongoing debates about how to 
exactly implement these representations, and the various consequences of the methods. When you 
are done, we hope you agree with our modest assessment that there are certain important concerns 
with mental representations that have not been laid to rest. In particular, we have discussed that the 
problems of symbol-grounding and system-detectable error remain largely unsolved.  
In this paper we have argued that ecological information and the neural activity it creates can 
address all three features without falling foul of the problems. Our analysis is grounded in the notion 
that these components function to designate spatially and temporally distal properties to an 
organism, and more importantly, it is grounded in the specific way they achieve this designation (via 
the law-based process of specification). This fact of designation does mean that designating 
information and neural activity can be considered representational. We are not particularly 
concerned by this implication, because even if we call these “representations”, the fundamental 
analysis remains firmly grounded in the ecological ontology. We propose that this framework is best 
suited for expanding the scope of the ecological approach beyond the real-time control of action and 
into explaining more abstract cognition and the neural activity that supports it.  
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